Probability in many-world theories

A common criticism directed against many-world theories is that, being deterministic, they cannot make sense of probability. I argue that, on the contrary, deterministic theories with branching provide us the only known coherent definition of objective probability. I illustrate this argument with a toy many-worlds theory known as Kent's universe, and discuss its limitations when applied to the usual Many-Worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.

I'll also argue that subjective probabilities are unproblematic in the many-worlds setting by showing how the usual decision-theoretical axioms apply there, and finish by showing that together with a proper definition of measurement they suffice to derive the Born rule.

Collection/Series: 
Event Type: 
Seminar
Scientific Area(s): 
Speaker(s): 
Event Date: 
Mardi, Avril 16, 2019 - 15:30 to 17:00
Location: 
Sky Room
Room #: 
394